A report attributing political benefits to the treaty is illustrated by the work of John SetearFootnote 49 and Lisa Martin. Footnote 50 Your argument focuses on the heavy legislative barriers to the treaty consultation and approval process. Since presidents generally do not lack sufficient support in the Senate to obtain a two-thirds majority, they often face a considerable political battle to convince senators to vote in favour of a proposed treaty. This political struggle requires not only time and resources, but sufficient support may also require the President to make substantial concessions in other areas. Footnote 51 Since the conclusion of a contract entails such a high political cost, SETEAR and Martin state that only the presidents particularly involved in the agreement would be willing to go through the consultation and approval process. If no high level of engagement is required, the president would opt instead for a single agreement or close to Congress, footnote 52, which, as the authors assert, comes at a lower cost. Other countries are aware of this signal dynamic. If they enter into contracts with the United States, they would therefore abide by the proposed form of an agreement and, in some high-deployment scenarios, they may refuse to agree unless the president is prepared to commit to a treaty. The use of shelf life as a substitute for force of use is justified for three reasons. Let`s start with another approach to strength of engagement - the ability of an agreement to withstand shocks in the political or economic environment.

Footnote 64 The likelihood of shocks increases over time, and agreements are therefore more resistant to changing circumstances, including those that take longer. Therefore, sustainability is also positively correlated with this alternative concept of use force. Second, from a purely practical point of view, the duration of a contract can be measured objectively, while the competing concept of force of engagement would require a number of subjective decisions, such as the severity of the shock and the extent to which the agreement has withstood or has not withstood external pressure. Footnote 65 Third, different theories use interchangeable bonding force and durability concepts, suggesting that both concepts can be considered substitutes. Footnote 66 69 See z.B. U.S. Department of State, A Guide to the United States Treaty in Force, at vii (Igor I. Kavass ed., 2016) ("T] here is a very weak correlation between bilateral thematic categories and multilateral headings.